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Abstract
Background
Counterfactual thinking is a specific type of conditional reasoning that enables the genera-
tion of mental simulations of alternatives to past factual events. Although it has been broadly
studied in the general population, research on schizophrenia is still scarce. The aim of the
current study was to further examine counterfactual reasoning in this illness.
Methods
Forty schizophrenia patients and 40 controls completed a series of tests that assessed the
influence of the “causal order effect” on counterfactual thinking, and the ability to generate
counterfactual thoughts and counterfactually derive inferences from a hypothetical situa-
tion. Socio-demographic and clinical characteristics, as well as neurocognitive variables,
were also examined.
Results
Compared to controls, the schizophrenia patients generated fewer counterfactual thoughts
when faced with a simulated scenario. The pattern of response when assessing the causal-
ity effect of the order was also different between the groups, with the patients being more
frequently unable to attribute any ordering of events than the control subjects. Additionally,
the schizophrenia patients showed more difficulties when deriving normative counterfactual
inferences from hypothetical social situations. None of the counterfactual reasoning mea-
sures was associated to any of the cognitive functions or clinical and socio-demographic
variables assessed.
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Conclusions
A global impairment in counterfactual thinking characterizes schizophrenia patients.
Because of the potential impact of such deficits on psychosocial functioning, targeting coun-
terfactual reasoning for improvement might be considered in future treatment approaches.
Introduction
Counterfactual thinking (CFT) is a specific type of conditional reasoning that takes place when
thinking about past events. In this context, most people automatically compare the actual out-
come of the event with “what might have been” by generating hypothetical “if only” outcomes
supposing an alternative event had taken place [1,2]. For instance, in the fictional situation
where John has failed an important test, he might generate a counterfactual thought like, If I
had studied more, I could have passed the test. Theoretically, CFT has been framed in norm the-
ory [3] as a biased decision-making process, and in themental models perspective [4] as one of
the “building blocks of reasoning.” Used in response to real-world experiences, counterfactual
reasoning relies on mental models of alternative possibilities that are represented in the form of
mental simulations [5]. There is general agreement that CFT is related to other processes such
as problem-solving [1], causal judgements [6] and deductive reasoning [7], as well as being
important for mood regulation [6] and having a daily life coordination function, influencing
behavioural changes and performance improvement [8].
CFT has been studied by examining the ability of individuals to generate counterfactual
alternatives, as well as by looking at other effects that have been considered to influence CFT
such as order effects. One of the most studied of these latter effects is the “causal order effect,”
which describes how, when faced with a hypothetical scenario involving a chain of events that
has a negative outcome, most subjects tend to choose the first event in the scenario as the main
determinant of the outcome [9]. CFT processes have also been studied by examining inferences
resulting from CFT in the face of hypothetical social events [3,10].
Regarding CFT’s neuroanatomical correlates, the involvement of the prefrontal cortex
(PFC) generally and, more specifically, the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) has been evidenced by
studies of patients with PFC lesions [11], traumatic injury to the frontal lobe [12], Parkinson’s
dementia [13] and Huntington’s disease [14]. Patients with these disorders demonstrate diffi-
culties in generating a normal level of counterfactual alternatives as well as in foreseeing the
possible negative consequences of their own actions. This may contribute to their tendency to
persevere with certain behaviours and strategies that have been proven no longer beneficial.
Functional neuroimaging studies have also found that the PFC is activated during CFT tasks
[15,16], and more specifically that the OFC is activated in decision-making that has CFT com-
ponents [17].
Schizophrenia is, among its other clinical features, characterized by delusions and distur-
bances in the logical structure of thought. Additionally, the disorder is linked to prefrontal dys-
function [18,19], and patients show impoverished decision-making and problem-solving skills,
logical reasoning alterations [20], as well as a tendency to perseverate and to have a poor ability
to generate novel ideas and plan for the future [21,22]. The presence of cognitive biases
involved in the formation and maintenance of positive symptoms has also been increasingly
recognized in recent years [23–25]. These biases include an information-gathering cognitive
style that is characterized by jumping to conclusions, externalizing attributional biases, and
deficits in understanding social situations and the intentions of others—Theory of Mind
Counterfactual Reasoning in Schizophrenia
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0148440 February 1, 2016 2 / 14
C. was supported by a contract awarded by the
Agency of University and Research Funding
Management of the Catalan Government (AGAUR;
2009SGR1554). [http://www10.gencat.net/agaur_
web/AppJava/english/index.jsp] The funders had no
role in study design, data collection and analysis,
decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.
Competing Interests: The authors have declared
that no competing interests exist.
(ToM) deficits [26]. It is not clear, though, whether these biases are independent from each
other or whether, on the contrary, they represent parts of a yet undetected whole [27]. Taking
into account that, in healthy people, CFT is known to play a role in the false belief reasoning
development [28], and to enhance memory distortions (e.g., hindsight bias) that contribute to
suboptimal decision-making [29], but also to be involved in ToM deficits in schizophrenia
patients (i.e., difficulties in the processing of counterfactual information such as sarcasm) [30],
it would be interesting to explore this type of conditional thinking within the cognitive biases
tradition. Also relevant is the impact these cognitive deficiencies might have on schizophrenia
patients’ personal and social functioning—on the difficulties they present in their everyday
activities, interpersonal relationships, or academic and work performance [31].
However, studies on the relationship between schizophrenia and CFT are scarce, even
though this type of investigation involves an interesting and innovative application of a para-
digm from experimental cognitive psychology. To our knowledge, there has been only one
study to date, which was carried out on a relatively small sample of 14 schizophrenia patients
and 12 healthy controls and which used two different CFT measures. First, the generation of
spontaneous counterfactual alternatives was explored by asking the participants to recall a neg-
ative personal event, after which the total number of thoughts about how this event could have
turned out differently was recorded. Second, the ability to make counterfactually derived infer-
ences was assessed using a measure specifically designed for the study, the Counterfactual
Inference Test (CIT). The results indicated that the patients generated fewer counterfactual
thoughts than the controls and showed a different pattern of responses when counterfactually
deriving inferences. Both impairments were related to the patients’ deterioration in social func-
tioning but not to cognitive measures including the Vocabulary and Digit Span subtests of the
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS-R) and with the FAS Verbal Fluency test [32].
The aim of the present study was to extend previous research examining CFT in schizophre-
nia, using a larger sample of patients and control subjects. Moreover, to our knowledge, this is
the first time that the causal order effect in CFT has been employed in this patient group. The
study further examined whether CFT performance was related to any basic cognitive domains
using a detailed neuropsychological battery of tests designed to assess cognitive impairment in
schizophrenia—the Brief Assessment of Cognition in Schizophrenia (BACS) [33,34]. Potential
associations with socio-demographic and clinical variables were also explored.
Materials and Methods
Study design
This case-control study was conducted in the outpatient services of the Psychiatry Department
of Bellvitge University Hospital in Hospitalet de Llobregat, Barcelona, Spain. The Clinical
Research Ethics Committee of Bellvitge (CEIC) approved all study procedures, and all subjects
gave written informed consent before inclusion.
Participants
Forty schizophrenia patients who met DSM-IV-TR [35] criteria were included in the study.
Subjects with diagnoses of bipolar, schizoaffective, delusional or other Axis I disorders were
excluded. Four of the schizophrenia patients had been treated with electroconvulsive therapy
at least once in their lives, but not within the six months prior to entering the study. Forty
healthy control subjects without a history of personal or family psychiatric illness or substance
use disorder were recruited from hospital employees. All participants were excluded if they had
a history of brain injury, an estimated Intelligence Quotient (IQ) lower than 70 or a mental
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disease due to a medical condition. The groups were matched for gender, age and educational
level.
Measures and procedures
Mental and personality disorders were assessed in both groups using the structured clinical
interview for DSM-IV Axis I Disorders (SCID-I) [36] and Axis II Personality Disorders (SCI-
D-II) [37] prior to enrolment. The examination of the schizophrenia patients was performed
on two consecutive days: on the first day, clinical variables were recorded and cognitive func-
tion was assessed; on the second day, CFT was evaluated. The assessment of the healthy con-
trols was carried out in a single session. Socio-demographic and clinical variables were
recorded by means of an in-house standardized evaluation. Symptoms and severity of illness
were assessed using the Spanish version of the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS)
[38,39] and the Clinical Global Impression-Schizophrenia Scale (CGI-SCH) [40]. Level of
functioning was assessed using the Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) scale [41]. Phar-
macological treatment was recorded, and daily dose equivalents of chlorpromazine were calcu-
lated [42].
Neuropsychological testing. A broad range of cognitive domains were evaluated with the
Brief Assessment of Cognition in Schizophrenia (BACS), in the Spanish validation of which
our group participated [33]. The functions assessed were verbal memory, working memory,
motor function, verbal fluency, attention and processing speed, and executive function. Finally,
the Spanish version of the vocabulary subtest of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale battery
[43] was administered to give an estimate IQ that was relatively resistant to postmorbid decline
in the patients.
CFT evaluation. CFT was evaluated with three different tests given in the following order:
assessment of the causal order effect, generation of counterfactual thoughts and the ability to
make counterfactually derived inferences.
The first two measures were assessed through the research paradigm proposed originally by
Wells et al. [9], which consists of a written scenario of four consecutive independent events
that result in a negative outcome. In order to avoid first event bias, the researcher randomly
changed the order of the events using a 4x4 Latin square design. All participants had to read
the scenario, which in brief consisted of an individual who heard on the radio that a store on
the other side of town had a great sale on a limited number of stereo systems. His/her progress
in getting to the store was impeded by four consecutive minor misfortunes: a) a speeding ticket,
b) a flat tire, c) a traffic jam, and d) a group of elderly people crossing the street. Because of
these mishaps, he/she arrived late only to find out that the last stereo system had already been
sold just a few minutes earlier. This scenario provided the basis for two experiments that were
carried out.
First of all, in Experiment 1, designed to assess the causal order effect, participants were
asked to choose and justify which of the four events was, in their opinion, the most probable
cause for the negative outcome and, therefore, the event that they would select in order to undo
the scenario. Participants who, even when encouraged, were still unable to choose one of the
events, were directly assigned the response type “reasoning blocking.” This was done to ensure
that these responses were not considered as missing data. The time given to participants to
complete this experiment was 60 seconds. Researchers recorded each participant’s answer.
Secondly, in Experiment 2, the generation of counterfactual thoughts was evaluated by ask-
ing the participants to write down possible alternative ways they could have arrived in time to
buy the stereo system; these could be either new original alternatives (e.g., “If only I had called
and made a reservation in advance”) or alternatives that changed one of the “unfortunate”
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events (e.g., “If only I hadn’t been speeding”). Participants were given five minutes to complete
this experiment. The number of different counterfactual thoughts produced was recorded by
two independent researchers, who filtered which of the participants’ answers were real CFT
answers and which ones were illogical or bizarre answers (e.g., “I continued sleeping”).
Finally, the Counterfactual Inference Test (CIT), originally developed by Hooker et al. [32],
was administered to measure ability to generate counterfactually derived inferences. This test is
based on previous research which has shown that CFT influences affective and judgemental
(cognitive) reactions regarding social events, and also that CFT is heightened in the face of out-
comes preceded by unusual rather than typical actions [3], as well as when individuals are
faced with events that seem “almost” (either spatially or temporally) to have occurred [10]. The
CIT (for an overview of the test, see Table 1) consists of a set of four forced-choice questions;
for each, two events with similar outcomes experienced by two subjects are presented. How-
ever, the circumstances between them differ such that in one the subjects should think “if only”
to a greater extent than in the other. The target questions vary to reflect different higher order
inferences. Therefore, item 1 focuses on a general affective reaction (“upset”) in the context of a
spatial “nearly happened” event; item 2 on a general affective reaction (“regret”) in response to
an “unusual” event; item 3 on a judgemental or cognitive reaction (“rumination”) brought on
by a temporal “nearly happened” event; and item 4 on a judgemental or cognitive reaction
(“judgements of avoidance/prevention”) in the face of an “unusual” event [32]. Each of the
four questions describes a hypothetical social event and participants are given three possible
answers: a normative answer (that is, the target counterfactual response), a non-normative
response and a “same/can’t tell” response if the participant considers none of the previous
options to be suitable. The CIT total score is calculated from the typical/normative pattern of
responses, based on previous research using a sample of undergraduate control subjects [32].
Each item on the test is given a score of 1 if the subject chooses the normative answer—that is,
the option where the subject would most probably think “if only”; if the subject chooses any of
the other answers (non-normative or “same/can’t tell”) they receive a score of zero. Therefore,
Table 1. Counterfactual Inference Test (CIT) [32].
Items Response
ITEM 1: Reaction of upset (affective) in response to a spatial “nearly happened” event. a) Janet
Janet is attacked by a mugger only 10 feet from her house. Susan is attacked by a
mugger a mile from her house. Who is more upset by the mugging?
b) Susan
c) Same/Can’t
tell
ITEM 2: Reaction of regret (affective) in response to an “unusual” event. a) Ann
Ann gets sick after eating at a restaurant she often visits. Sarah gets sick after eating at
a restaurant she has never visited before. Who regrets their choice of restaurant more?
b) Sarah
c) Same/Can’t
tell
ITEM 3: Reaction of rumination (judgemental) in response to a temporal “nearly
happened” event.
a) Ed
Jack misses his train by ﬁve minutes. Ed misses his train by more than an hour. Who
spends more time thinking about the missed train?
b) Jack
c) Same/Can’t
tell
ITEM 4: Reaction of avoidance (judgemental) in response to an “unusual” event. a) Bob
John gets into a car accident while driving on his usual way home. Bob gets into a car
accident while trying a new way home. Who thinks more about how his accident could
have been avoided?
b) John
c) Same/Can’t
tell
Note. The typical/normative pattern of responses are indicated in boldface [32].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0148440.t001
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the total score may range between 0 and 4, with greater values indicating a counterfactual
response closer to a normative pattern. Participants were given five minutes to complete the
test.
Statistical analysis
For the descriptive analyses, absolute and relative frequencies were calculated for categorical
variables. Continuous variables were assessed using the mean and standard deviation (SD) for
normally distributed variables and the median and interquartile range (Q1-Q3) for non-nor-
mally distributed variables. In order to detect differences between groups, Fisher’s exact test
and χ2 were used for categorical data, whereas the t-test and the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test
were applied to parametric and non-parametric continuous data, respectively. Normality of
distributions was checked using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. In Experiment 1, in order to
test whether the observed proportions departed from the expected p = 0.25 (i.e., equally distrib-
uted frequencies per category in each group was considered the null hypothesis), a χ2 goodness
of fit test was performed on each group. In multivariate analyses, linear and logistic regression
models were used depending on whether the dependent variable was considered continuous or
binary respectively. Finally, General Linear Models were used to assess the possible influence of
cognitive variables on CFT measures, generating models adjusted for gender, age and educa-
tional level. In all analyses, the differences were assessed using a statistical test based on two-
tailed significance at p = 0.05. To account for the multiple comparison issue, the False Discov-
ery Rate (FDR) suggested by Benjamini and Hochberg was applied [44]. The data were man-
aged and analyzed using the statistical software package SPSS (Version 18.0 for Windows
SPSS, Inc., Chicago, Ill).
Results
Socio-demographic and clinical characteristics, and neuropsychological
performance
Socio-demographic characteristics and neurocognitive measures are summarized in Table 2.
More schizophrenia patients were unemployed and single at enrolment, and they obtained sta-
tistically significantly lower scores in all cognitive domains than the healthy control subjects.
Clinical characteristics for the patients group are shown in Table 3.
CFT evaluation
Experiment 1: The causal order effect. Although the pattern of ordering the events to
undo scenarios was found to be different between the schizophrenia patients and the healthy
controls (p = 0.033; Table 4), both groups chose the first event to undo the scenario more often
than the second, third or fourth event (p<0.05 in both groups). The proportion of schizophre-
nia patients choosing the first event was lower (45% for patients vs. 60% for control subjects),
although the difference was not statistically significant (p = 0.179). The patients were signifi-
cantly more frequently unable to attribute any ordering of events; in other words, they were
more frequently unable to choose any event at all (22.5% vs. 5.0%; p = 0.023).
Experiment 2: Generation of counterfactual thoughts. The total number of answers gen-
erated spontaneously (both real and non-real counterfactual thoughts) was not significantly
different between the schizophrenia patients and the healthy controls (p = 0.173). However,
when only the total number of real counterfactual thoughts was taken into account, the patients
generated fewer thoughts than the control group (p = 0.015; Table 5). Moreover, the propor-
tion of subjects unable to generate any thought (that is, zero answers) was significantly higher
Counterfactual Reasoning in Schizophrenia
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Table 2. Socio-demographic characteristics and neurocognitive measures.
Schizophrenia Patients (n = 40) Healthy Controls (n = 40) p-value
Socio-demographic characteristics
Male gender, n (%) 23 (57.5) 25 (62.5) 0.65
Age (years) 39.4 (12.2) 39.8 (12.3) 0.88
Educational level (years) 10.4 (3.6) 11.2 (3.3) 0.27
Employment status, n (%) <0.001
Employed 13 (32.5) 35 (87.5)
Student 2 (5.0) 0 (0.0)
Unemployed/Retired 25 (62.5) 5 (12.5)
Civil status, n (%) 0.02
Married 7 (17.5) 17 (42.5)
Single 32 (80.0) 20 (50.0)
Divorced 1 (2.5) 3 (7.5)
Hand Dominance (right /left), % 95.0/5.0 97.5/2.5 0.56
Neurocognitive measures
Estimated Intelligence Quotient 97.3 (12.2) 111.6 (8.9) <0.001
Verbal memory 34.0 (12.0) 43.7 (6.5) <0.001
Working memory 14.6 (4.2) 18.4 (3.3) <0.001
Motor function 67.5 (16.6) 82.9 (9.2) <0.001
Verbal ﬂuency 27.8 (10.3) 44.7 (8.6) <0.001
Processing speed 35.4 (14.6) 53.7 (8.4) <0.001
Executive function 17.9 (3.0) 19.1 (1.7) 0.039
Note. Values presented as means (standard deviation) unless speciﬁed otherwise.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0148440.t002
Table 3. Clinical measures in schizophrenia patients.
Clinical measures in schizophrenia patients
Age of onset of schizophrenia (years), median (range) 21.5 (15–34)
Duration of illness (years) 16.7 (10.8)
Readmissions (episodes), median (range) 2.0 (0–12)
Suicide attempts (episodes), median (range) 0.00 (0–4)
CGI-SCH 14.88 (3.1)
GAF, median (range) 60.0 (50–80)
Pharmacological treatmenta 548 (373)
PANSS Dimensions
Positive symptoms 13.5 (3.4)
Negative symptoms 22.1 (5.9)
General Psychopathology 37.6 (8.8)
Total score 73.15 (16.14)
Note. Values presented as means (standard deviation) unless speciﬁed otherwise. CGI-SCH: Clinical
Global Impression Scale-Schizophrenia Scale; GAF: Global Assessment of Functioning; PANSS: Positive
and Negative Syndrome Scale.
aMilligrams per day in chlorpromazine equivalents.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0148440.t003
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among the schizophrenia patients than the healthy controls (22.5% vs. 5.0%). There were no
statistically significant correlations regarding any measure of the study and the daily antipsy-
chotic dose taken.
Generation of counterfactually derived inferences. Significant differences were found for
the items related to “regret” (general affective reaction) in response to an “unusual” event and
to “rumination” (judgemental/cognitive reaction) in response to a temporal “nearly happened”
event (Table 6). Regarding the “regret” item, a significant proportion of patients were unable to
choose between the normative and the non-normative response, choosing the “same/can’t tell”
answer (p = 0.042; item 2). In the case of the “rumination” item, a higher proportion of schizo-
phrenia patients selected the non-normative response (p = 0.037; item 3) rather than choosing
the normative response or the “same/can’t tell” answer.
However, the difference in CIT total score did not reach statistically significant differences
(p = 0.130)—that is, both groups generally tended to choose the target counterfactual response.
CFT and socio-demographic, clinical and neurocognitive measures in the schizophrenia
patients. After FDR correction, no statistically significantly associations were found between
any of the CFT measures and any of the clinical, socio-demographic (S1 Table) or cognitive
variables assessed (data not shown).
Table 4. Experiment 1: Descriptive and comparative analysis of the causal order effect.
Schizophrenia Patients (n = 40) Healthy Controls (n = 40) p-value
Experiment 1: The causal order effect
Order of the events, n (%) 0.033
1st 18 (45.0) 24 (60.0)
2nd 7 (17.5) 4 (10.0)
3rd 4 (10.0) 2 (5.0)
4th 2 (5.0) 8 (20.0)
Reasoning blockinga 9 (22.5) 2 (5.0) 0.023
1st vs. 2nd, 3rd, 4th, reasoning blocking 18 (45.0) 24 (60.0) 0.179
aUnable to choose any event.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0148440.t004
Table 5. Experiment 2: Descriptive and comparative analysis of the counterfactual thoughts generation.
Schizophrenia Patients (n = 40) Healthy Controls (n = 40) p-value
Experiment 2: Generation of counterfactual thoughts
Total number of answers generated,a median (Q1*-Q3**) 2.0 (2.0–3.0) 3.0 (2.0–3.0) 0.173
Number of counterfactual thoughts, median (Q1-Q3) 2.0 (1.0–2.0) 2.0 (1.0–3.0) 0.015
Number of counterfactual thoughts, n (%)
0 9 (22.5) 2 (5.0)
1 10 (25.0) 9 (22.5)
2 14 (35.0) 15 (37.5)
3 7 (17.5) 12 (30.0)
4 0 (0.0) 2 (5.0)
aIncluding both real and non-real counterfactual thoughts.
*Q1: percentile 25;
**Q3: percentile 75.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0148440.t005
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Discussion
The present study focused on the assessment of CFT in patients with schizophrenia. Only one
previous study has assessed CFT in this group of patients [32], and it found that they generated
fewer counterfactual thoughts and showed an altered different pattern of responding compared
to healthy controls. Our study examined the influence of the causal order effect in CFT, and
the ability to generate counterfactual thoughts and to counterfactually derive inferences. Our
results demonstrate significant alterations in schizophrenia patients on all three measures com-
pared to well-matched controls. No significant associations were found with clinical and socio-
demographic status, as well as with neuropsychological functioning.
The analyses revealed the causality attribution pattern to be significantly different between
the schizophrenia patients and the healthy controls. This might be due to the fact that the
patients tended to get blocked more frequently when asked to determine the event they would
select in order to undo the scenario and avoid the negative outcome. In other words, and in
contrast to previous research with general population, our results suggest that in schizophrenia
there is a tendency to deviate from the normative ordering pattern by choosing the first event
less frequently than the controls. Thus, this alteration might influence these patients’ daily
functioning since they do not attribute causality in the same way. Hence, it would be interesting
to study this topic in relation to conceptual disorganization or formal thought disorder in
schizophrenia.
Our findings are also in line with those of a previous study that found impoverished CFT
generation in schizophrenia patients [32]. In this, the patients generated less CFT alternatives
when faced with simulated scenarios, but more importantly, they also tended to be unable to
generate any CFT (zero answers) that would avert the negative outcome more often than
healthy controls. Interestingly, though, the results also suggested that the patients that could
activate CFT (i.e., they could generate at least one alternative) to a degree similar to the healthy
Table 6. CIT: Descriptive and comparative analysis of the counterfactually derived inferences assessment.
Schizophrenia Patients (n = 40) Healthy Controls (n = 40) p-value
Total score, median (Q1*-Q3**) 2.0 (1.3–3.0) 3.0 (2.0–3.0) 0.130
Upset (item 1), n (%) 0.415
Normative response 14 (35.0) 13 (32.5)
Non-normative response 10 (25.0) 6 (15.0)
Same/can’t tell 16 (40.0) 21 (52.5)
Regret (item 2), n (%) 0.042
Normative response 21 (52.5) 31 (77.5)
Non-normative response 11 (27.5) 7 (17.5)
Same/can’t tell 8 (20.0) 2 (5.0)
Rumination (item 3), n (%) 0.037
Normative response 26 (65.0) 35 (87.5)
Non-normative response 11 (27.5) 3 (7.5)
Same/can’t tell 3 (7.5) 2 (5.0)
Judgements of avoidance (item 4), n (%) 0.372
Normative response 25 (62.5) 23 (57.5)
Non-normative response 6 (15.0) 11 (27.5)
Same/can’t tell 9 (22.5) 6 (15.0)
*Q1: percentile 25;
**Q3: percentile 75.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0148440.t006
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controls. Nevertheless, it seems from both this and our study that schizophrenia is a disorder
where patients experience difficulties in activating alternative representations to reality and
have difficulties in re-imagining a negative outcome in a positive way using conditional
reasoning.
When exploring a higher cognitive level of information processing (i.e., the generation of
counterfactually derived inferences) in our “bottom-up” experimental design, we obtained
results suggesting that schizophrenia patients do not follow the normative counterfactual rea-
soning pattern: they less frequently selected a regretful reaction in response to an “unusual”
event or a judgement-related reaction in response to a “nearly happened” event. Among emo-
tions related to CFT, the experience of regret may have an adaptive function because it can
guide future decisions, based on information gathered from the outcome of previous choices
[45,46]. Whereas in the normal population, most people react with greater regret to an unusual
event, the reaction of the schizophrenia patients in our study was the same regardless of
whether the event was usual or unusual. These findings appear to be in line with those of a pre-
vious study which found that both schizophrenia patients with prominent positive symptoms
and patients with OFC lesions did not report regret and did not anticipate negative conse-
quences resulting from their choices [47].
Regarding cognitive judgement-related reactions, the present study found that schizophre-
nia patients showed a lower tendency to react with rumination when faced with a negative tem-
poral “nearly happened” event. Their worse performance here reflected the fact that they
tended to disregard the negative outcome of a social event and hence exhibit a maladaptive
response. These results could be considered consonant with the fact that the negative symp-
toms of schizophrenia (e.g., blunted affect, emotional withdrawal and apathetic social with-
drawal) lead to an inability to deal with emotions or interpersonal relationships. In addition,
our results might also contribute knowledge to the study of cognitive biases in schizophrenia.
The different patterns of responses that our patients presented when making causality attribu-
tions and when counterfactually deriving inferences might be conceptually linked to the study
of jumping to conclusions and externalizing attributional biases (e.g., choosing one event from
the sequence in the causal order effect experiment) that have been demonstrated in the disor-
der [23–25], as well as ToM deficits [26] (e.g., perceiving the beliefs and intentions of the CIT
characters).
In contradiction with previous research findings [32], our results suggest that the CFT
impairment observed was not related to psychosocial functioning deficits in this sample of
schizophrenia patients. However, taking in account that in the general population CFT has
been proposed as a cognitive process that contributes to effective psychosocial function [8],
future studies using other measures of social dysfunction in larger samples of patients may be
warranted.
Furthermore, taking into account that schizophrenia is associated with compromise in
almost all cognitive domains [48–50], we explored the potential link between the various cogni-
tive functions assessed and CFT performance. However, although the neuropsychological
exploration was more extensive than in previous research, the results were that none of the var-
iables examined was associated with CFT impairment. These results are similar to those of
Hooker et al. [32], who also failed to find a relationship between CFT performance and any of
the neuropsychological variables they assessed. Accordingly, they proposed that CFT could not
be explained either by a generalized cognitive deficit or a specific function like verbal fluency.
The relationship between basic cognition and higher cognitive processes is controversial: for
example, whether social cognitive and basic cognitive processes are associated is a question not
yet adequately answered [51–53]. Authorities in this field like Green et al. [54] have suggested
that these two domains must overlap, and the argument is about the degree to which they
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overlap. In the same way, debate about whether CFT deficits could be the result of a pervasive
cognitive impairment or is dependent on a specific deficit in a certain cognitive domain can
still be considered to be open.
The present study has some shortcomings that should be acknowledged. Firstly, it is impor-
tant to note that while the sample used in this study was larger than the one used in previous
research [32], it still included only a relatively small number of participants. This could have
resulted in a lack of statistical power and greater chances of making a type II error, increasing
the possibility that the study was not able to detect actual differences between groups. Secondly,
our sample did not meet criteria for clinical stability, although the median total PANSS score
was 73.1 (SD = 16.14) which indicates a relatively low level of current symptoms. Future
research might consider recruiting patients in remission as defined by Andreasen et al. [55] to
assure that their cognitive functions are not biased by active symptomatology. Thirdly, use of a
case-control design prevents drawing conclusions on whether the CFT impairment observed
originated after or before the onset of the illness.
In conclusion, findings from the current study evidence a global impairment in counterfac-
tual reasoning of schizophrenia patients compared with healthy controls. Because of the poten-
tial ecological impact that counterfactual thinking deficits might have on these patients’
functional outcomes, we suggest that these deficiencies could be considered as a future target
for treatment in schizophrenia. Finally, it would be interesting to study whether CFT could be
considered a new cognitive endophenotype for schizophrenia by conducting research among
healthy relatives. Considering the NIMH Research Domain Criteria project’s new approach to
research, we suggest that the study of CFT might be included as a subconstruct alongside other
cognitive processes [56].
Supporting Information
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